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"MAKE THE RING IN YOUR MIND"
EMILY FOWLER HARTIGAN*
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW. By Martha Minow. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

1990. Pp. xii, 403. $24.95.
By Patricia J. Williams. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp. 247. $24.95.
THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS.

When I agreed to review Martha Minow's Making All the Difference** for St. John's, I thought I'd benefit from a close reading
of a work by the woman whose article Foreword: Justice Engendered in the Harvard Law Review was power and paradigm in
feminist jurisprudence.' The book promised to render the multiple

differences of race, gender, disability, and orientation, part of a
whole discourse on difference. I anticipated a synthesis and a distinctive perspective which would be accessible to the general
reader.
I was not disappointed; yet I realized as I read that I was more
bothered than I thought I would be by the contradiction which Minow's ideas play with her genre. It is not that her way of writing is
not valuable. She is remarkably lucid, and even adds from time to
time what she herself calls "shimmers" to her writing. But what
she names 2 at the outset-a relational approach, with a sensitivity
to boundaries-she does not deliver. I want to investigate that conundrum, and to suggest why it seems to be-but is not-the unavoidable dilemma of the gifted female scholar in law today.
Before allowing herself to be personal or poetic, Minow apparently feels she must be "scholarly." (If Minow is a bellwether, then
even tenure at Harvard does not make the true feminine safe. But
* Visiting Associate Professor, Tulane University School of Law. B.A., Swarthmore College; Ph.D., J.D., University of Wisconsin. Thanks to my colleague Bill Lyons for bringing
his true attention to this writing, to Joan Shaughnessy for sharing delight in Williams' writing, and to the SVHE group on Elizabeth Sewell.
** Cited below by page number only.
I Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10 (1989).
2 Hans-Georg Gadamer calls naming the original possibility of everyday speech: "To

name something is always to call it into presence." H.
BEAUTIFUL 135 (1987).
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there is the Alchemist...) This is how Minow herself describes the
necessity of relegating feminist, relational thought to precepts but
not to practice:
The rules in established academic institutions about what counts
as theory offer another example. The criteria of coherence, value
neutrality, and abstraction may embody the false universalism
that feminists criticize. Yet to be counted by establishment institutions as theory, feminist approaches must resemble the objects
of their attack (p. 238).
Three pages earlier, Minow has cited Audre Lorde's The Master's
Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, but apparently
has not agreed with its thesis or its force. Disturbingly, the
paragraphs following the above quotation suggest that she has too
little desire to dismantle the Master's house or even to leave it. As
the statement of a brilliant, reflective woman at the supposed acme
of academic institutions of free thought and expression, it is devastating. Yet there is an alternative.
The relationship between poetry and philosophy has been the
subject of discussion since Socrates and before;4 it has surfaced
strongly in recent times. Its new turn arises in part from the emergence of the female-feminine in the world of "reason," rather than
just the "feminine" imagination in man's mind and soul. Women
are now beginning to speak their own selves, rather than being
only spoken of or to. Women like Sandra Harding embody the dilemma of attaining a female and a feminine voice, even as we are
unsure what a feminine voice might be. Harding writes in a linear,
discursive style which is to first reading traditionally clear, clean,
abstract, propositional.5 She is a philosopher of science and epistemology, speaking in a discourse dominated by men, with men, in
their language. Her lucidity has the spare aesthetic of a Brancusi
sculpture, of abstract art. It has its own beauty.
Harding's message is, to some extent, antithetical to her medium. She argues for the feminine, for perspectives, for experience.
She is careful not to fall into "mere" phenomenology, so that her
Lourde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in Tins
(C. Moraga & G.
Anzaludua eds. 1981).
H. GADAMER, supra note 2, at 131ff ("Philosophy and Poetry"), 105ff ("On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth"); PLATO, PHAEDRUS 245; REPUBLIC 607b; see also
M. NUSSBAUM, LoVE's KNOWLEDGE (1990).
5 S. HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? (1991).
3
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writing cannot be dismissed by those who refuse to take experience
as a primary base for discourse. Yet, what she says makes a space
for just such narratives of experience, for talk textured and structured vastly differently from hers. To read one of her essays is to
experience the rhythms, codes, and sequences of academic analytic
philosophy, on the way to a conclusion which robs her own discourse of its solo sovereignty.
Minow's book is similar. I recommended it to a colleague returning to academia as a superb study guide to jurisprudence today. Her footnotes are comprehensive, rich, even. Her discussion of
difference is structured, leavened with story, finished with conclusions well balanced on paradoxes. It is welcoming to the reader
who is not outside the mainstream; it will disorient only from time
to time, always returning to a framework of the relational which is
somewhat novel, yet in her rendering, comfortingly consistent.
But Allan Hutchinson names its first flaw; on the level of
"self-contradiction": she is absent. We cannot relate to her as a
person, once we get beyond the tantalizing first introduction.. We
hear an elegant playing out of her political stance, sympathetic in
its implications, measured in its reach. We do not hear her voice or
the texture of her story. In a section titled "Absent Friends,"
Hutchinson talks of the effects of her self-effacement: "she manages to occupy a critical space that is both everywhere and nowhere: she floats over and through her text as a kind of
postmodern phantasm . .. she comes unintentionally close to in-

voking the presumed authority of detached analysis and continuing the unconvincing ventriloquism of modernist thought."6
What might seem to be an oversight (forgetting to practice
what she preaches, despite, Hutchinson testifies, her attractive personal presence) becomes more when the second implication of the
absence of the entire person who is Martha Minow, is included. In
her impersonal presentation, she has no poetry. We do not know
her individual passions; we do not meet her poetic soul. There is
little feminine about the text except for its consistently applied
doctrinal priority for relationship. There are moments when the
doctrine warms beyond its grey sheen, hinting strikes of color-but
they are too few.
I might have continued to delve for the shimmers, the mo8

Hutchinson, Inessentially Speaking (Is There Politics After Postmodernism?), 89

MICH. L. REv. 1549, 1569 (1991).
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ments of poised prose which caught the poetic-but I took up Patricia Williams' The Alchemy of Race and Rights,7 and I was gone.
Starting with herself, telling us we may as well know with whom
we're dealing, we meet Patricia Williams in her blue terry cloth
bathrobe, and she is not happy. We journey with her, and she is
not sure she is sane. We risk, hurt, struggle, and laugh with her,
through to the whispered incantation, hilarious after much litcrit
babble: "Floating signifiers." She weaves a path in and out of normal white male discourse, carrying us along in mind, heart and
spirit. She does not offer some single-layered lucidity, or analysis
structured at right angles, but moves with conceptual and imaginative fluidity through lived narrative, doctrinal analysis, contemporary discourse, emotional range-finding, anger imprinted imagery,
and sly, high-spirited irony. There is such richness of readerly sensation interwoven throughout the text that the reader is pulled
into its flow, never to be the same. That is, if the reader is willing.
Why would the reader hesitate? I recall one Nebraska colleague's response to a paper Williams gave at a Feminism and Legal Theory conference at Wisconsin Law School a few years back, a
paper which is woven into the present volume. He returned it disdainfully to me, saying that it was not scholarship, but apparently
something gleaned from her personal journal. Later, the same man
(an engineering grad) told me that my problem was that my style
interfered with my analysis; I replied that Freud said that style
was identity, and that what he found annoying, I found constitutive. It is not that Williams' discourse is antithetical to analysis; on
inspection, it requires it, as Marie Ashe suggests: "Ecriture feminine [feminine writing] is the designation used to identify writing
that, in a startling and difficult-to-define manner, is both rigorously analytical and highly poetic . . . ."' Like Socratic dialogue,
the living milieu of the argumentative structure, adorned by the
personal, gives it force. If language is a form of life, as Wittgenstein dramatically cried in liberation, then it must be lived to be
true. Williams' discourse is lived-unmistakably, brilliantly, shakingly, painfully, joyously lived. Like her blue robe, it comes to life
because she is vividly present in it. She discloses what has in the
past been discreetly read in between the lines or through intellec7 P. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
8

Ashe, Inventing Choreographies:Feminism and Deconstruction (Book Review), 90

COLUM. L. REv. 1123, 1133 n.42 (1990).
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tual histories combining biography with idea. Such self-narrated
context for concepts is not solely the province of women; Stuart
Hampshire's Innocence and Experience' gains its power largely
from his life narrative of the genesis of his ideas. Accounts of how
thoughts come to authors and how they were wrestled into a
shared story, have the same wholeness of impact as the personalities' byplay in the dialogues of Plato. Even fuller than Alcibiades'
drunken profession of passion for Socrates, is Marie Ashe's story of
reproduction in her life-in mind, body, heart, soul. 10 These are
not interacting bits of mind, but genuine human encounters, external and internal, which give breath to words.
What of Minow's more abstract, static aesthetic? Is the shift
of subject matter enough to make her work interesting and new?
Her generalizations are much warmer when she is talking about
her relational theory of difference, than when engaging in the ritual critique of viewpoints. She talks about the structural anthropologists, for instance, and asks "[i]f structures exist because they
are functional, what would cause or produce change" (p. 186), a
telling recounting of a major argument against structuralism, but
hardly a searing insight. Yet on the next page, she touches on the
self which is emergent through relationships with others: "The
boundaries of the self are defined in relation to those other people;
the boundaries are where we are in touch with others" (p. 187).
This begins to sound more interesting. But, by the next page, we
are on our way out of this theory and on to another, literary theory. Is it any wonder that the literary gets fewer than two pages in
this book of nearly 400? There are three and a half pages on feminist literary theory, later-but I reflect: how fair do I have to try to
be to Minow, when she dismisses the very epistemology of the aesthetic most likely to rival the dominant discourse, in five pages?
Minow uses a framework of relational knowledge consistently
and deftly, showing where it emerges in a multitude of cases and
stories. She has a striking working knowledge of it and maintains a
well-trimmed version of relationalism through a series of intellectual schools and historical issues. However, the absence of citation
to her intellectual progenitors is baffling. She cites, in her first
foray into perspectivalism, many of the white male authors who
(1989).
Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" and
the
Seamless
and
10 Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching
the Law, 13 NOVA L. REv. 355 (1989).
9 S. HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE
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initiated an attack on post-Enlightenment positivism, but fails to
name Michael Polanyi, whose PersonalKnowledge" was key in articulating to the canon-readers much of what was lacking in their
search for the impersonal, neutral, "objective observer." She has
little notion of phenomenology or much of what hermeneutical
thought has done to elaborate relational knowledge. Although
there is much to be said about how Carol Gilligan is not the only
feminist who began relational writing, Minow does not say even
that. Many of these insights are available in feminist jurisprudence. Given the remarkable breadth of her footnotes, the shallowness of her account of her key conceptual scheme's historical foundation is most disturbing. Even the use of considerable
psychological literature fails to redress the gaps. How can she discuss this sense of knowing as relating, without the entire tradition
of continental thought swirling around Emmanuel Levinas, for example, with his reflections on the Other? Surely her two pages on
French feminism, and her consternation at their supposed deliberate dislocation of discourse and disruption of meaning, are not
meant to be sufficient in a world in which many of the American
women whom she does note argue that relations between men and
women are up for grabs?
The very terms of discourse which she uses recapitulate what
legal authors like Drucilla Cornell have identified as, in its fancy
name, phallogocentrism, or white male discourse. This sort of writing does not relate to the reader in the way participatory texts are
designed to do, nor does it tap the considerable literature on what
is most closely allied to the feminist notion that the personal is the
political: personal, literary, even poetic writing. Such writing is not
coincidentally central to feminist method, nor is it reflected only in
continental writers like Levinas. Paul Ricoeur speaks of the transfiguration of the world of action by the poem, and his "concern to
combine analytical precision with ontological testimony.' 1 2 The literary quality of writing about law and literature is manifest in
James Boyd White's beautiful prose.' 3 Such writing shows that all
knowledge is finally metaphorical and analogical-even "scientific"
knowledge. Ricoeur explores this continually, as do Minow's colleague Stanley Cavell, and such writers as (Cavell's favorite) EmerM. POLYANI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (1958).
On Interpretation,in AFTER PHILOSOPHY: END OR TRANSFORMATION 380 (K.
Gaynes, J. Bolhman & T. McCarthy eds. 1987).
18 See especially the last two chapters of J.B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION (1990).
12 Ricoeur,
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son, and Elizabeth Sewell. Sewell, who is increasingly of interest to
scientists, displays poetically the sort of personal knowledge of
which Polanyi wrote many years ago, combining biology and verse
in an "Orphic" voice which sings sense. 4 Reclamations of Europeans, even dead ones, like Walter Benjamin, who claim the poetic
make-up of reality (and of reality-making), are rich but unnecessary.15 Minow could have found Stanley Cavell right there at
Harvard, praising Emerson in his personal, non-"philosophical" essay style, because philosophy itself is becoming indistinguishable
from literature. If Cavell is right, then we have a right to ask of
writers not only traditional cogency, but an "investment in words"
which may even demand a style of writing.1 6 At the least, we can
prefer the engaged writer, whose commitment dances in her prose/
poetry." Cavell lauds and Williams demonstrates writing inhabited
by both passion and dispassion, by both attachment and detachment, by both head and heart. I have little doubt that Minow has
brought heart to her task, but she has subsequently hidden it
under her ideology-and ideology, even in the best sense, is thinner stuff than full human "transfiguration of the ordinary"
through "inhabiting our investment in words."' 8
Minow's theory, wonderfully lucid, spun out in consistent
loops of history and reason, repudiates itself by sustaining the undifferentiated discourse of the post-Enlightenment analytic. She
claims to have read the others, if that is what footnoting does:
"Rights discourse implicates its users in a form of life . . .," noting
Wittgenstein dutifully (p. 298). But Wittgenstein refused precisely
to continue in the pseudo-rational discourse of academic philosophy. He wrote in journals, ruminated, meditated in words about
pain, about "someone" who was in pain, but who . . . well, we
know, if we read these two books, that Williams is often in pain.
Williams links pain and thought irreversibly, indelibly. Minow
speaks of a community which would invigorate words with power
(p. 299) (to restrain)-but hers are not really invigorating. She
talks of pain, but rarely discloses or connects the reader to first
person hurt which directly confronts the reader.
14

E.

SEWELL, THE ORPHIC VOICE

(1960).

(1969).
z' S. CAVELL, CONDIrrONS HANDSOME AND UNHANDSOME 34, 44, 61 (1990).
17 And we can resist the erasure of writers like Williams through what she names, in her
table of contents, "The Ideology of Style."
18 S. CAVELL, supra. note 16, at 61.
Ricoeur, supra note 12, at 147ff; W.

BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS
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Is it just that I prefer Williams' style? Along with the internal
contradiction of bloodless feminist discourse, I think there are a
number of things which I might cite to suggest otherwise. I will
explore the one which is to me most obvious and most important.
It is not just Williams' passion that Minow lacks; it is also the
spirit. In discussing writers who might have some glimmer of spirit,
Minow simply does not see spirituality as a category of discourse.
She talks about De Bois's Souls of Black Folks but not about souls
(p. 68). She mentions writers like Alice Walker, but not Walker's
stark yet vibrant sense of unseen reality. Minow dutifully notes all
the attacks on single perspective knowledge-claims, yet leaves beyond the margin, the conversation of religion. Her attack on the
single, coherent view of society is in fact conflated with the attack
on the notion of the design of nature and God (p. 148). This sort of
history-bound blindness to the language of spirit is hardly particular to Minow, but it is illustrative of the peculiarity of a celebration of difference, of margin, of otherness, which is itself exclusive,
not inclusive.
Fifteen years ago, Elizabeth Sewell used language now emergent in feminist discourse to grapple with the rigidity of Compte's
triple progression (linear, of course) from religion to philosophy to
positive science. She described the process as "shaking" her mind,
working with circles, networks, and spirals, rather with than
straight lines.
If I could, what I would now do is to set up in the middle of this
linear page a circle which would say SCIENCE TO MAGIC TO
SCIENCE TO MAGIC TO SCIENCE in a ceaseless ring; and it
fascinates me that I cannot do that with my linear typewriter,
and would have trouble, even if I attempted such a thing, with a
linear minded editor and typesetter. Please make the ring in your
mind, nevertheless. 9
In contrast to Minow, Williams speaks from a wholeness which
cannot avoid spirit. She talks of the intrusion against blacks as total-bodily and spiritual. She imagines a return to understanding
property as a reflection of the universal self, to dispersing rights
under an animating spirit which fires our psyches, so that we do
not own gold, but that "a luminous golden spirit owns us."20 She
leaves the text telling us of her demand to be seen and enfolding
19

SeweU, An Other World, in To BE A TRUE POEM 112 (1979).

20 P. WILLAMS, supra note 7, at 165.
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herself in the watchful presence of polar bear spirits. 21 She is telling us about a world in which she is crazy, wild, spirited, impassioned, reflective, brilliant, becoming, shatteringly bright, imperiously fragile, irrefutably alive in her sentient, pulsing intelligence
beyond thought.
Williams' alchemy, threaded through with persistent strands
of the rational, is a crucial magic for the law. In a stunning essay,
"Law Courts and Dreams, 2 2 Sewell talks of the connection between dreams as internal court of judgment, and the public fantasy
and nightmare which can be law. 23 She finds the jury a counterbalance against rule-bound code, introduced into the logical structure
of the law court, for "plurality, disorder, unreason. ' 24 She lauds
the tension of reason and unreason, of logic and dream, calling
these components the very essence of the tension mind, of sanity-and of poetry.2 5 She taps the parallel evoked in Plato, of the
correspondence between the individual and the polity, and touches
on what Emerson called the Oversoul, that collective place of lessthan-full consciousness. This is the world which Williams traverses
with such fierce grace, drawing us from the realm of the "obvious"
public logic of law, down, through, and returning, from what lies
beneath. I defy a reader to face, unmoved, Williams' narration of
the killing of a sick old black woman by white shotguns. She asks
after the "animus that inspired such fear and impatient contempt
in a police officer that the presence of six other well-armed men"26
could not overcome his fear, his need to blow her to pieces (with an
egregious second shot). She looks for an "offensive spirit of his past
experience," for a "spirit of prejudgment, of prejudice ' 27 which
provided him such a "powerful hallucinogen" (these are the same
words Sewell cites to describe the spectral political trials which
haunt us-of Weimar, of McCarthyism). She taps cultural archetypes, voices speaking of an unwanted past-and warns that so
long as these voices of racial hatred are scoffed at as superstitious,
paranoid, they will speak in their neglect from the shadows of inattention, and the enlightened, ignoring their demonic selves, will
21Id. at 236.
22 Sewell, Law Courts and Dreams, in To BE A TRUE POEM, supra note 19, at 17.
23 Id. at 20.
Id. at 24.
2' Id. at 21.
26 Id. at 144.
27

Id.
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make the barbarism only larger, "until the nearsightedness of looking-glass existence is smashed in by the terrible dispossession of
dreams too long deferred. ' 2 I challenge you to read this chapter of
shotgun chaos, Fire and Ice (133ff), and sleep the same as before.
Read it, read for your life.
I have done it again, I think. I am telling you why Patricia
Williams is alive for me and beautiful, Martha Minow only helpfully clear. This issue of style is not incidental. All the different
ways of knowing and writing suggested by feminists are part of the
postmodern movement to newness-in-difference. Thus religious
philosopher Mark Taylor chronicles Heidegger's development, in
which Heidegger realizes that "style itself is more than a question
of style," and concludes that new style is an opening into a new
way of thinking and writing. "The names given to this alternative
style of reflection vary: poesie, literature, sometimes simply writing."' 29 It more closely approximates art than science, literature
than philosophy.3 0 Taylor attributes the force of new writing both
to its intrusive nature and its impact. "To think differently we
must write differently and vice versa." Further, to change style is
to tamper with "the complex institutional networks constructed to
separate the legitimate from the illegitimate."' l Taylor says such
writing courts punishment; Williams supplies the stories of
verification.
If you are really open to letting a book change your soul (and
the thoughts and feelings resounding in it), read this alchemist's
tale. If the world of Patricia Williams simply cannot yet speak to
you, please read Minow. Her book is flawed, but makes much of
what might open you to Williams, intelligible. Minow might succeed in tapping in you as reader some curiosity, some openness to
the "difference" of Williams. Minow might persuade your mind
that Williams has a place, is of value. But, if only your mind
knows, you will still not hear Williams. By now, that will be your
loss. No longer the new faculty member at Wisconsin presenting
those strange papers, Williams began this fall as full professor at
Columbia. Without knowing any of the inside story, I would bet
that Williams is the one, consciously or not, Derrick Bell has been
8 Id. at 145.
Taylor, The Cutting Edge of Reason, 71 SOUNDINGS 315, 324 (1988).
80 See H. CIxous & C. CLEMENT, THE NEWLY BORN WOMAN 64-65 (1986); see also THE
29

POETICS OF GENDER (N.K. Miller ed. 1986).
"' Taylor, supra. note 29, at 325.
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holding out for, the tenured black woman Harvard needs. And,
even with the lucidity of Martha Minow, Harvard needs Patricia
Williams more than, in this generation at least, it is likely to
understand.
What will Harvard's loss mean to the rest of us? Will we be
bound by the ritual denial which Clarence Thomas repeated dutifully: his personal beliefs would have no bearing whatsoever on his
decisions as a judge. He is all abstraction, no connection. In person
in-personating, Patricia Williams is connecting for us all; she is
among the women who are, in the words of Jew Judith Plashow
and Christian Carol Christ, Weaving the Visions 2 anew. She engages for us the terrors of knowing that her "round brown face"
can close doors and sunder minds. She binds the law to the texture
of reality, intertwining the threads of the legal with the particularity of her story and those of persons of color and poverty to whom
she is so passionately attached. The sick old woman, the remarkable black judge who lost her mind, the Patricia Williams who defied the Dartmouth summer's obliviousness to her marginal
race-these portraits of the personal caught up in the world of law,
are undeniable, beautiful, gifts.

2 J. PLASKOW & C. CHRIST, WEAVING THE VISIONS

(1989).

